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Baruch, or Benedictus, Spinoza (1632–77) is the author of works, especially the 
 Ethics and the Theological-Political Treatise, that are a major source of the ideas of 
the  European Enlightenment. The Ethics is a dense series of arguments on progressively 
narrower subjects – metaphysics, mind, the human affects, human bondage to pas-
sion, and human blessedness – presented in a geometrical order modeled on that of 
Euclid. In it, Spinoza begins by defending a metaphysics on which God is the only 
substance and is bound by the laws of his own nature. Spinoza then builds a natural-
istic ethics that is constrained by, and to some extent is a product of, his strong 
metaphysics. Human beings are individuals that causally interact with other indi-
viduals and are extremely vulnerable to external influence. They are not substances. 
Moreover, human beings are bound by the same laws that bind all other individuals 
in nature, so Spinoza presents accounts of goodness, virtue, and perfection that are 
consistent with these perfectly general laws. Spinoza’s principal influences include 
René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes (see hobbes, thomas), Moses Maimonides (see 
maimonides, moses), the Roman  Stoics (see stoicism), and Aristotle (see aristotle). 
Although his innovative philosophical views undoubtedly contributed to the 
strong writ of cherem, or ostracism, that Spinoza received from the Portuguese Jew-
ish community of Amsterdam in 1656, his work nevertheless also shows the influ-
ence of the study of Scripture and of Jewish law.
Metaphysics as a Constraint on Ethics
In his metaphysics, Spinoza defines a substance as a thing that is in itself (or, roughly, 
that is wholly causally independent) and that can be understood without under-
standing anything else (E1d3). Only God, Spinoza argues, fits this  description: 
“Except God, no substance can be or be conceived” (E1p14). All other things, then, 
Spinoza calls modes of substance, entities that cannot exist apart from other things 
or be understood without an understanding of other things (E1d5). Spinoza makes 
thought and extension attributes of substance, or “what the  intellect perceives of 
substance, as constituting its essence” (E1d4). Just as the one  substance, God, may be 
understood to be essentially either thought or extension, so Spinoza argues any one 
mode of extension is identical with a mode of thought (E2p7s). A human being, for 
example, is well understood as a body or a mind.
Spinoza defends both determinism, the view that prior conditions in uniform 
ways determine every change in the world (E1p28), and necessitarianism, the view 
that things could not be other than the way they are. His metaphysics is thus  different 
from that of his successor, Leibniz, who rejects necessitarianism and famously 
2argues that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds. For Spinoza, “Things 
could have been produced by God in no other way and in no other order than they 
have been produced” (E1p33).
Spinoza takes his claim that God is bound by necessity to have the further  important 
negative implication that God does not act with a purpose: “To show now that nature 
has no end set for it and that all final causes are nothing but human  fictions will not 
be much work. Indeed I believe that this is already well-established … from all of 
those propositions by which I have shown that all things proceed by eternal  necessity 
and with the highest perfection” (E1, Appendix). God’s causal power is to be 
 understood rather in terms of uniform natural laws and the causal power of each 
individual mode to bring about effects in accordance with those laws (E1p34, E3p6).
These strong metaphysical views constrain Spinoza’s ethics dramatically. 
Three constraints are especially noteworthy. First, Spinoza’s conception of God rules 
out any view on which there exists a providential God who is distinct from the world 
and creates the world for human beings. Second, his determinism implies that no 
actions, including human actions (E2p48), are free in the sense of being without an 
efficient cause. Finally, Spinoza’s commitment to the view that all changes whatever 
are to be understood in terms of uniform natural laws commits him to naturalism 
(see naturalism, ethical). Spinoza expresses his naturalism bluntly in the Preface 
to Part 3 of the Ethics, declaring that man is not “a kingdom within a kingdom” 
and that his geometrical method will therefore apply to human beings in the same 
way that it applies to all other things in nature: “I will consider human actions and 
 appetites just as if it were an investigation of lines, planes, and bodies.”
Bondage to Passion
On Spinoza’s ethical theory, whatever impedes human beings in their striving to 
persevere in being is evil, whether it is something outside the body that prevents a 
person from being able to do what he wants, ignorance of the means to  perseverance, 
or a passion of the mind that causes a person to want something other than 
 perseverance and its means. Whatever helps striving, on the other hand, is good. 
This section will provide an account of the impediments and aids to striving.
Spinoza defines imagination at E2p17s: “The affections of the human body, the 
ideas of which represent external bodies as present to us, we shall call the images of 
things, even if they do not reproduce the figures of things. And when the Mind 
regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines.” Ideas of imagination thus 
include all of our ideas of things that are partially caused by external objects, 
 including sensory ideas, memories, and ideas produced by the experience of written 
or spoken language (E2p40s2). They also include passions (E3, General Definition 
of the Affects, E4p1s).
At E2p41, Spinoza argues that ideas of imagination are the only cause of falsity. This 
point hints at a tendency in Spinoza to associate cognitive error, such as the error that 
I commit in moving from the sensation of the sun in a pool of water to the conclusion 
that the sun is in the water, with practical or moral error, such as the error I commit in 
3moving from the pleasure I take in eating a bite of cake to the action of eating the 
whole cake. Just as passions are similar in kind to sensations, so practical error that 
arises from passion is similar in kind to cognitive error that arises from sensation.
The similarity in kind of sensation and passion is a powerful tool in Spinoza’s  ethics 
because it allows him apply Cartesian resources for the avoidance of cognitive error to 
the case of the passions. Descartes held that we can avoid the cognitive error that typi-
cally arises from sensation by arriving at a better understanding of what sensation tells 
us about the external world. For example, I will not judge external objects to have color 
once I understand that color is best understood as a feature of my ideas rather than as 
a feature of things (Principles of Philosophy I.68). Alterna tively, we may have a sensory 
idea that gives us a tendency to make a false judgment about some external object, but 
we may be guided by a different, better idea of the same object, and so avoid error. In 
Meditation III, for example, the meditator avoids error by following an astronomical 
idea of the sun rather than a sensory idea in judging the sun’s size. Spinoza applies ver-
sions of both techniques in his discussion of  remedies for the passions (5p3, 4p7), and 
the few explicit unqualified prescriptions in the Ethics recommend that we use them. 
At E5p4s, he recommends a better understanding of our passions:
We should work especially hard in order to know each affect clearly and distinctly, 
insofar as it can be done, so that thereby the mind may be determined from an affect 
to thinking those things that it perceives clearly and distinctly and in which it may be 
completely content; and also so that the affect may be separated from the thought of an 
external cause and joined to true thoughts.
At E5p10s, Spinoza recommends that we resist harmful passions by cultivating 
 better, opposed passions:
We should think and meditate often about common human wrongs and how and in 
what way they may best be driven away by nobility … We should recount in detail and 
frequently imagine the common dangers of life, and how, by presence of mind and by 
strength of character, they may best be avoided and overcome.
In addition to being ideas of imagination, passions are also changes in an 
 individual’s essence, its striving to persevere in being. Spinoza introduces his theory 
of striving at the beginning of Part 3 of the Ethics. He argues at E3p6 that all  individual 
things strive to persevere in being. This claim serves his naturalism by bringing what 
appears to be a psychological doctrine on which anything, if it is not impeded, will 
act to persevere, close to a physical thesis, the principle of inertia, on which any body 
in motion, if it is not impeded, will continue in that motion. Indeed Spinoza’s term 
for “striving,” conatus, is a technical term of physics for Descartes, referring to that 
component of a thing’s motion that belongs properly to the thing ( Principles of 
Philosophy III.57).
Spinoza begins to build an account of what striving is for the human mind at E3p9: 
“The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and also insofar as it has 
4confused ideas, strives to persevere in being; it does so for an indefinite  duration; and 
it is conscious of this, its striving.” Two features of this crucial proposition deserve 
emphasis. First, Spinoza maintains that we strive insofar as we have  confused ideas. 
Second, we are, in some way, conscious of our striving. The second feature is the basis 
for Spinoza’s account of desire, which he identifies with striving and,  especially, the 
consciousness of striving (E3p9s). On its basis, on might interpret E3p9 as a very 
straightforward and obviously false theory of human desire: I strive to persevere; I 
desire just as I strive; therefore I desire to persevere. The first  feature complicates the 
interpretation of E3p9; it also shows that Spinoza has a more  plausible account of 
conation. As we have seen, Spinoza takes ideas of imagination to be the only source 
of falsity. We have also seen that they are incomplete, perhaps inaccurate, representa-
tions of their objects. Certainly insofar as we strive to persevere from clear and dis-
tinct ideas we will consciously desire perseverance. Because we also strive insofar as 
we have confused ideas, however, it is not clear that our  consciousness of striving 
always reproduces in our conscious experience the object of striving. Although 
Spinoza holds that I do strive to persevere insofar as I have confused ideas, he does 
not hold that I consciously desire perseverance insofar as I have such ideas. Indeed, 
those who are most in the sway of passion may desire other ends exclusively:
When the greedy man thinks of no other thing besides profit or money, and the 
 ambitious man of glory, and so on, they are not believed to be mad, because they are 
often troublesome and are estimated to deserve hatred. But really greed, ambition, 
lust and so on are species of madness, even though they are not counted among the 
 diseases. (E4p44s)
So all our conscious desires are, in some way, manifestations in consciousness of a 
striving to persevere in being, but those that are ideas of imagination are not 
 necessarily, or even ordinarily, conscious desires for perseverance (see egoism).
Human affects include passions, which are confused ideas, and also active  emotions 
such as those that Spinoza mentions at E5p10s, nobility and tenacity, which are not 
confused and cannot lead us to error. At E3p11 and its scholium, Spinoza describes 
the affects in terms of changes in the power with which a person strives, and he uses 
terms that suggest what the conscious experience of such changes is like. An increase 
in a body’s power of acting, or in the power of acting of part of that body, is a form of 
laetitia (roughly, happiness); a decrease, however, is a form of tristitia (roughly, sad-
ness). Because Spinoza’s terms for changes in the power with which a person strives 
at least appear to describe familiar conscious states, these definitions suggest a sense 
in which, although I do not always consciously desire perseverance in being, my 
desire may nevertheless always manifest a striving to  persevere: if I do always desire 
ends in which I anticipate laetitia, then I am always desiring to experience an increase 
in the power with which I strive even if I do not recognize the end in question as such 
a thing. Thus the greedy man, for example, if he anticipates laetitia in profit, does 
strive for perseverance in being also, after a fashion. Spinoza does come close to 
 giving an account of desire like this one at E3p28 (see hedonism).
5Perseverance and what increases our power to persevere are good on the account 
of the Ethics, and this brief account of Spinoza’s psychological theory shows that there 
may be several barriers to the good facing a human agent. First, I may be weak. 
Because, as a finite mode, my power is limited, I may, despite my well-founded desire 
for perseverance and its means, lack the power to attain them. Second, I may be igno-
rant. In that case, despite my well-founded desire for perseverance, I may lack knowl-
edge of its means. Finally, I may be overwhelmed by passion. In this case, I may, even 
despite my knowledge of what helps me to persevere, be influenced by an external 
object to desire some other end. Although, as we have seen, Spinoza argues that better 
ideas may overpower worse ideas and so help us to avoid error, he does not hold that 
they always do (E4p17). So passion may move me to seek some other end even as, at 
the same time, I also desire perseverance. (Spinoza’s admission of the possibility of 
akrasia is an important departure from Descartes; see weakness of will.) Although 
the Ethics does contain accounts of the means to perseverance (see especially Spinoza’s 
discussion of society at E4p35–7), the great bulk of its  argument describes the pas-
sions and the ways in which we can resist their influence. Clearly, Spinoza regards the 
influence of passion as the first and greatest barrier to the attainment of value.
Good, Virtue, Perfection
We now turn to Spinoza’s account of value. The Ethics includes formal definitions of 
a variety of terms associated with moral value:
E2d6: By “reality” and “perfection” I understand the same thing.
E4d1: By “good” I shall understand this, what we certainly know to be useful to us.
E4d8: By “virtue” and “power” I understand the same thing, i.e. (by 3p7) virtue, 
insofar as it is related to man, is the essence or nature of man itself, insofar as 
he has the power of bringing about those things that can be understood through 
the laws of his nature alone.
These definitions need to meet the constraints both of Spinoza’s metaphysics, 
 especially his naturalism, and also of his psychology.
An account of value poses a challenge for Spinoza’s thoroughgoing naturalism 
because it is not clear whether moral properties are like other properties or whether 
there is a sense in which moral evaluation can apply to all things in nature alike. 
Spinoza does clearly attempt to meet these challenges in his definitions by reducing 
perfection (see perfectionism) and virtue (see virtue) to properties that, on his 
metaphysics, any individual thing will have: reality and power. In his definition of 
his most important term for value at E4d1, Spinoza might appear to meet the 
 challenge similarly well by reducing goodness to usefulness. That definition requires 
further discussion, however, because, as the discussion of usefulness in the Preface 
to Part 4 indicates, E4d1 refers to a certain kind of teleology: “By ‘good’ therefore in 
what follows I shall understand this: what we certainly know to be a means by 
6which we may move close and closer to the model of human nature that we set 
before us.” As we have seen, Spinoza rejects the view on which nature itself has 
ends. Unlike Spinoza’s definitions of “perfection” and “virtue,” then, this sense of 
“good” will not obviously apply across nature. On the other hand, a rejection of a 
view on which nature itself has ends does not imply that particular individuals in 
nature may not have ends.
A discussion of the good in relation to Spinoza’s psychology can inform a  discussion 
of E4d1. In Part 3 Spinoza makes two related claims about the ordinary use of the term 
“good,” which associate it with something familiar across nature, a change in power.
E3p9s: It is established from all this, then, that we strive for, will, want, or desire 
nothing because we judge it to be good; rather, we judge something to be good 
because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it.
E3p39s: By “good” here I understand every kind of laetitia, and whatever leads to it, 
and especially this: what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be … 
Indeed we have shown above (E3p9s) that we desire nothing because we judge it 
to be good, but on the contrary, we call “good” that thing we desire.
The fact that people find good what they desire and what they associate with laeti-
tia is unqualified: both the ordinary people described in the Appendix to Part 1 
and the enlightened philosophers who accept 4d1 will do so (see desire theories 
of the good). Indeed Spinoza’s association of the good with laetitia, an increase 
in striving, gives this association a basis in his account of human nature. The ordi-
nary person, however, understands by that term something that is made well by 
God, and this understanding is both false and harmful (E1 Appendix). Spinoza’s 
formal definition retains the familiar notion of the good as something that advances 
an end. In  making that end a human rather than a divine creation, however, Spi-
noza both conforms to regularities of use and also avoids the enshrinement of a 
false doctrine.
See also: aristotle; desire theories of the good; egoism; hedonism; 
hobbes, thomas; maimonides, moses; naturalism, ethical; perfectionism; 
stoicism; virtue; weakness of will
REFERENCES
All references to Spinoza’s Ethics abbreviate Spinoza’s formal apparatus. For example, “E3p9s” 
stands for Ethics, Part 3, Proposition 9, Scholium.
All Descartes references are to the Principles of Philosophy or the Meditations, which are avail-
able in a number of translations.
Descartes, René 1971. Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 11 vols. 
Paris: Librarie J. Vrin.
Spinoza, Baruch 1972. Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
7FURTHER READINGS
Curley, Edwin 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Curley, Edwin (ed. and trans.) 1994. A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Della Rocca, Michael 2008. Spinoza. New York: Routledge.
Garrett, Don (ed.) 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Israel, Jonathan, and Michael Silverthorne (eds. and trans.) 2007. Spinoza: Theological-
Political Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
James, Susan 1997. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kisner, Matthew 2011. Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy, and the Good Life. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Koistinen, Olli (ed.) 2009. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
LeBuffe, Michael 2010. From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Nadler, Steven 2006. Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
